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1. Natural Disasters and ‘the Political’
1.1. The End of the Flight from ‘the Political’
In March 2011, it seemed as though politics in Japan had reached a
stalemate, its people beset by political apathy verging on the endemic. Yet,
such sentiments of apathy and aversion were abruptly dispelled with the
sudden occurrence of the Great East Japan Earthquake on 11 March. This
enormous earthquake, with a magnitude said to occur only once in a
millennium, triggered an almost instantaneous and colossal loss of human
life and caused widespread destruction of property. Moreover, the
coincident occurrence of an accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Plant incited a nationwide fear of further fatalities beyond
imagination. No matter how disappointing Japanese politics is or how
plagued it is by political distrust, this emergency situation demanded a
political response, which forces us to turn to a consideration of politics.
Inevitably, this marked the end of the apolitical tendency, which was rife
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within Japanese society, of avoiding looking too closely at things such as
politics. In one stroke, the combination of a large-scale natural disaster and
a nuclear catastrophe destabilised Japanese society by creating a situation
in which the threat to life was felt collectively by the nation, suddenly
laying bare ‘the Political’ that had until then remained hidden.
The concept of ‘the Political’ was discussed at length by Carl Schmitt
(1888-1985), a twentieth-century German jurist and political theorist, who
located the essence of politics in an effort to distinguish between one’s
friends and enemies, and then to destroy one’s enemies. As suggested by
the creation of the derisive term ‘nuclear village’, the Japanese people,
glued to their television sets watching the responses of the government
and nuclear industry as the nuclear accident unfolded, finally learned just
how rampant ‘the Political’ had become in their nation’s hidden recesses,
concealed by the so-called ‘myth of safety’. What has been learned cannot
be unlearned. In our efforts towards the recovery and reconstruction of the
areas affected by the disaster and what promises to be a time-intensive
solution to the issue of radiation leaked from the reactors, focus on political
matters is unavoidable. No matter the feelings of discomfort and bitter
horror that politics might evoke, it is politics that will shape our lives and
future. It is now time to bring our flight from ‘the Political’ to an end.
The Germany of the Weimar Period, in which Schmitt conceived ‘the
Political’, was marked by serious social unrest─a consequence of the series
of devastating blows to Germany’s economy resulting from its defeat in the
First World War, the enormous war debt imposed by the Treaty of
Versailles, astronomical inflation and the Great Depression, as well as of a
number of violent incidents such as riots and assassinations. Politics was
the means to overcome these crises. However, Schmitt’s analysis of
European intellectual history identified the appearance of what he called a
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‘spirit of technicity’ in the spiritual core of twentieth-century Europe,
marking the arrival of the final stages of neutralisation and secularisation
as processes of modernisation. In other words, European modernity, in
pursuit of the resolution of political conflict, had reached a point where it
sought a minimisation of politics based on overall neutralisation through
technology, i.e. an escape from ‘the Political’. This spirit of European
modernity, which sought to minimise politics and suppress ‘the Political’,
was manifested in the form of Germany’s Weimar Constitution.
According to Schmitt, the parliamentary system under the Weimar
Constitution was based on the principle of a civil constitutional state, one
configured not as an institution for making political decisions but rather as
a liberal mechanism for monitoring political power and protecting civil
liberties. Germany was on the verge of collapse, and although a political
solution was required to overcome this crisis, the parliament based on the
Weimar Constitution worked to suppress politics and was unable to
assimilate the German masses into a unified community. Judging from
Schmitt’s account, far from resolving the crisis, the Weimar Constitution
actually served to amplify it. Therefore, in a Germany where the very
survival of the state had been threatened, Schmitt sought to recall the
basis of the state to its people and resurrect politics and re-establish
Germany as a strong state by manifesting ‘the Political’ concealed in the
interstices of everyday society.１）
The fact that technology is in and of itself politically and morally neutral
means that it cannot determine the direction in which humanity should
proceed. Even with regard to an accident at a nuclear power plant, which
１）On Schmitt, cf. Takeshima Hiroyuki, Kāru Shumitto no seiji ―‘kindai’ e no
hangyaku [The Politics of Carl Schmitt: Rebellion against Modernity], Fūkōsha,
2002.
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should presumably have been developed and designed to combine the best
of cutting-edge science and technology, it is ultimately politics, not
technology, that decides how to respond and how to determine ways to
derive a solution. The occurrence of future large-scale earthquakes in
regions such as the Tokai and Tonankai have been anticipated, and there
are demands for long-term initiatives to find measures and solutions to
prevent the occurrence of secondary disasters that might affect not only
the reconstruction of already affected areas but also the damaged
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor. However, we must involve ourselves in
these processes by calmly confronting the matter, offering our judgements
and raising our voices so that ‘the Political’ would not once again be
concealed and that we would not be used as tools of a short-sighted binary
opposition that distinguishes only between friends and enemies. In other
words, it is necessary that we are prepared to fight ‘the Political’ politically.
1.2. Two Views of Order Deriving from Schmitt’s ‘the Political’
and Hobbes’s ‘State of Nature’
Schmitt’s notion of ‘the Political’ was inspired by the concept of the ‘state of
nature’ proposed by the seventeenth-century English philosopher Thomas
Hobbes (1588-1679). The contemporary idea of basic human rights is
derived from Hobbes’s idea that humans are born free and equal, and his
theory of social contract is considered to be the theoretical foundation of
modern constitutionalism. Herein, through a brief summary of the
relationship between the arguments of these two thinkers, I would like to
establish the basic perspective behind Schmitt’s critiques of modernity and
liberalism as well as how Schmitt’s views of order differed from those of
Hobbes.
Schmitt deeply appreciated Hobbes’s philosophy and attempted to excise
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what he saw as the philosophy’s liberal ‘defects’ in order to revive it in the
modern era. Schmitt expanded Hobbes’s theories, in particular, from the
late Weimar period to the Nazi period, conceiving his own theory of social
order based on Hobbes’s theory of the state in Der Begriff des Politischen
[The Concept of the Political], published in 1927 and subjected to major
revisions in the third edition issued in 1932,２） and Der Leviathan in der
Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes: Sinn und Fehlschlag eines politischen
Symbols [The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning
and Failure of a Political Symbol] (1938).３）
The ‘state of nature’ found in Hobbes’s Leviathan, as known from the
well-known phrase bellum omnium contra omnes [the ‘war of every one
against every one’], is a ‘state of war’ between individuals in which the
state has collapsed. In this stateless ‘state of nature’, individuals exist
independent of one another, equally enjoying unrestricted liberty, which is
exactly what causes them to fall into a ‘state of war’. Schmitt reconsiders
this ‘state of nature’ as a state of war in which friends are distinguished
from enemies, transforming the argument into a state of civil war between
groups and conceptualises this state of struggle between friends and
enemies as what he calls ‘the Political’.
According to Hobbesian political theory, to break away from this ‘state
of nature’ qua ‘state of war’, each individual in this pre-state condition
enters into a social contract that establishes the state. While these free and
equal individuals establish this state to preserve their own lives, once
established, each individual─now as a citizen─bears an obligation to the
state to obey its laws, i.e. its command. The obedience of the people to the
２）Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen: Text von 1932 mit einem Vorwort
und drei Corollarien, 8. Aufl., Duncker & Humblot, 2009.
３）Carl Schmitt, Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes: Sinn und
Fehlschlag eines politischen Symbols [1938], Hohenheim Verlag, 1982.
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state is correlated with the latter’s protection of the former. The people
are always duty-bound to observe the law, whereas the state is duty-bound
to defend its people. However, the ultimate basis of the obligations of both
parties is natural law, and natural law for Hobbes has its own logic in the
duty to God grounded in Christian morality. In addition, while it is true that
Hobbes argues that the state’s most important duty is the defence of its
people, he also argues that each individual is duty-bound to defend the
state that he or she has established so as to ensure its survival in cases
where it is immediately necessary that all members should take up arms
to cooperate for the defence of the state itself. Although Hobbes’s theory of
natural law differs from the natural law of mediaeval Christianity in that it
follows a logic that mixes discussions from ethics, psychology and law, it is
certain that God exists as the basis of the moral duty to observe this
natural law.
In the theory of the state presented by Hobbes in Leviathan, the core of
Christianity is only the minimum and fundamental article of faith that
‘Jesus is the Christ (the Messiah)’; all other doctrines are posited to be
controlled and managed by a civil sovereign in the interest of maintaining
order. It is, so to speak, the theory of a state ecclesiastical system that
subordinates ecclesiastical power within a system of unified control by a
civil sovereign. Such a state considers the ‘state of nature’ as its logical
foundation and is derived from the social contract based on the
abandonment of an individual’s natural rights. It is characterised by an
individualistic theory of human nature and a theory of absolute
sovereignty. While Schmitt basically adopts the logical structure of
Hobbes’s arguments, he, nevertheless, conducts the following logical
operation while minimising the former attribute and maximising the latter.
In other words, he seeks to exclude the elements he considers to be
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Hobbes’s philosophical ‘defects’, namely those liberal elements that would
render the state as a soulless mechanism. These are the perspective of the
‘internal freedom’ of individuals, which is the first step towards a liberalism
that would eventually trigger moral relativism, and a scientific way of
thinking to usher in a world dominated by a soulless technology. Then, he
highlights the Christian belief that ‘Jesus is the Christ’, an extremely
minimal metaphysical element in Hobbesian theory, as a universal principle
with which to unify the people as a community and mythologise the state.
Schmitt greatly expands the metaphysical elements apparent within
Hobbes’s theories of natural law and the state ecclesiastical system and
uses these by transposing them into his theory of the mythologisation of
the state. Then, to instil a constant fear within the German people, he
emphasises the ‘state of nature’ (i.e. a ‘state of war’) between states using
Hobbesian doctrine that, in the absence of a world state, equates the ‘state
of nature’ in international relations with a ‘state of war’, making a powerful
case for the nation’s defence.
Thus, Schmitt’s concept of order involves a state’s decision to use
Christian belief, situated at the core of the state, as a force to unify the
citizens into a homogeneous community. Thereafter, this belief becomes a
central axis for ‘the Political’ (i.e., the instabilities and tensions internal and
external to the state, generated by the theory of ‘friends and enemies’) to
instil continuous fear among the people, constantly stimulating the
mythologisation of the state. In other words, it is a theory of the state that
is founded on the dynamics of an artificial instability that results from the
antagonism between friends and enemies. The individualistic theory of
human nature, characteristic of Hobbes’s philosophy, is eliminated, and we
are presented with a theory of the totalitarian state based on a perspective
that is critical of liberalism, consequently rendering it as a theory of the
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state, which resembles but is distinct from Hobbes’s perspective.
While the image of Hobbes is strongly associated with militant and
violent politics as a result of his famous thesis equating the ‘state of nature’
to a ‘state of war’, at the heart of his theory of the state is the ‘civil state’,
or Commonwealth, that is established once individuals manage to break
away from this ‘state of nature’ through the formation of a social contract.
The challenges he sets for himself are how to end a war and restore order
and how to win and keep peace. A characteristic of Hobbes’s concept of
order is the legal orientation of the move from politics to law in a logical
structure that seeks to convert conflicts from those settled by force in the
‘state of nature’ into legal battles played out in a ‘civil state’, or
Commonwealth. Briefly, Hobbes’s concept of order has a static legal basis.
In contrast, Schmitt’s concept of order is dynamic in that it possesses an
orientation towards movement characterised by the move from law to
politics. By extension, Schmitt boldly attempts to overturn Hobbes’s
concept of order and free the political portion of the parliament and
presidency that had been repressed by the logic of a legal and civil
constitutional state in the Weimar Constitution and to convert them back
to original institutions that can bring about political decision making. In
other words, by identifying and highlighting the political portions in
Hobbes’s argument, he attempts to destroy the apolitical─even anti-
political─aspects within the logic of the civil constitutional state, which are
a consequence of the development of liberalism pioneered by Hobbes.
1.3. Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism and the Japanese Constitution
Schmitt’s intensive assault on liberalism was coloured by the specific aims
of Germany, which opposed the universalistic view of order propounded at
the time by Britain and America as well as the challenges of his day.
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However, even though his theories include dangerous ideas that might lead
to totalitarianism or otherwise expose the contradictions and principal
problems inherent within liberalism, it also has aspects that might
encourage us, as the inhabitants of liberal society, to fundamentally
reconsider our situation. In that sense, Schmitt’s reverse perspective may
be considered significant even today.
The angle from which Schmitt’s critique of liberalism challenged the
Weimar Constitution can also be used to approach the Constitution of
Japan, which is a consequence of modern constitutions. Adhering to
Schmitt’s viewpoint, this means that the group of extremely political issues
that have arisen in the basic structure of the nation─Article 9, the Self-
Defence Forces (SDF) and the Japan-US Security Treaty─have been
cleverly de-politicised under the Japanese Constitution through the
introduction of the logic of the civil constitutional state. Regardless of
whether one opposes or is in favour of amending the Constitution, or even
when considering state security or the problem of American military bases
in Okinawa, we need to contemplate this series of issues calmly and make
judgements by seriously considering ‘the Political’. As an example, the
Great East Japan Earthquake, in conjunction with its manifestation of ‘the
Political’, also inevitably illuminated fundamental problems that had
previously remained latent within the state and society.
From this understanding of our problem, in this paper, I would like to
shed light on the political aspects of Japan’s Constitution, specifically to
draw on a Schmittian perspective to reconsider issues with the SDF, the
Emperor System and national emergency rights that were made apparent
by the Great East Japan Earthquake.
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2. The Constitution of Japan and ‘the Political’
2.1. Law and Politics concerning the Provisions for Emergency Situations
In many countries, there are provisions for emergency situations which
allow the government to suspend the normal governing system and take
special measures to overcome a crisis in the event that a situation cannot
be handled by the peacetime legal system, such as a war or large-scale
natural disaster. However, the Constitution of Japan does not have such
provisions for emergency situations. When the Great Hanshin Awaji
Earthquake hit in 1995, the governmental response to the disaster caused
increased confusion, which triggered wide recognition of the need for risk
management. Under such circumstances, the following argument emerged:
in order to deal with emergency situations such as huge earthquakes,
provisions for emergency situations should be added to the Constitution of
Japan, the Prime Minister or the special agency for emergency situations
should be legally granted dictatorial authority, such as that described in the
‘Commissioned Dictatorship’４）of Schmitt.
Schmitt, in Politische Theologie [Political Theology] (1922),５） considered
the situation in which a nation barely continued to exist, but all existing
orders would be suspended as an ‘Exceptional Situation’６）and developed his
unique constitutional theory by putting this ‘Exceptional Situation’ on the
foundation of the sovereignty theory. According to Schmitt, the main
purpose of a modern state is to ensure the safety and order of its people
and, therefore, the nation’s supreme political leader should be granted the
authority for legal dictatorship based on the ‘Exceptional Situation’ so that
４）Carl Schmitt, Die Diktatur: Von den Anfängen des modernen
Souveränitätsgedankens bis zum proletarischen Klassenkampf [1921], 7.Aufl.,
Duncker & Humblot, 2006.
５）Carl Schmitt, Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität
[1922], 9. Aufl., Duncker & Humblot, 2009.
６）Ibid., 18.
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such leader, not bound by the peacetime legal system, may promptly make
decisions and handle the situation in a crisis threatening public safety. It
was the President’s right to give an emergency order under Article 48 of
the Weimar Constitution that Schmitt adopted as the legal ground for said
dictatorial authority.７） After World War II, West Germany inherited this
Weimar system for emergency situations and revised the Basic Law for
the Federal Republic of Germany (the Constitution), that was enacted
under occupation in 1949, having no provisions for either military forces or
emergency situations, to add the provisions for emergency situations.
Needless to say, out of the reflection on the time of Nazism, detailed
provisions to prevent the abuse of dictatorial power were laid down.
In Japan as well, the prewar Constitution of the Empire of Japan
(commonly known as ‘the Meiji Constitution’) had emergency situation
provisions incorporated. Specifically, the Emperor’s right under Article 8 to
give an emergency order, the martial law provisions of Article 14 and the
Emperor’s national emergency powers under Article 31 that stipulates that
the rights of citizens be restricted in the case of a war or national
emergency. While the Meiji Constitution was replaced by the Constitution
of Japan as a result of the defeat in World War II, coupled with the
transformation of the Emperor system and the renunciation of war in
Article 9, the provisions for national emergency rights disappeared. It does
not necessarily mean that every constitution of the various countries of the
world has emergency situation provisions incorporated; indeed, the
Constitution of the United States of America does not have such provisions.
In the case of Japan, although its Constitution does not have such
provisions, at the level of laws, various structures relating to emergency
situations are built in. These are the Act on Response to Armed Attack
７）Ibid., 18.
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Situations, Self-Defence Forces Law, Police Law, Disaster Countermeasures
Basic Law, and Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness, etc.８）
However, there is a view among constitutional scholars that it only
makes sense to discuss national emergency rights primarily in relation to
military attacks at home and abroad, such as in wars and civil conflicts,
and that their discussion in relation to natural disasters would in fact be
detrimental as it would benefit arguments for constitutional amendment in
a disaster-opportunist manner.９）
In general, while theoretical discussions of national emergency rights
may consider the actual definition of ‘crisis’ from a legal theoretical
perspective, in the case of Japan, to pose the problem of national
emergency rights under the current Constitution faces the unique situation
leading to an immediate political conflict of whether the Constitution should
be amended. In heuristic terms, this becomes a paradoxical opposition
around the question of what constitutes a ‘crisis’, with legal scholars who
can even entertain the possibility of ‘extralegal’ measures in emergency
situations to oppose amendment of the Constitution─politics on the side of
the law─ opposed by politicians who profess constitutionalism and demand
amendments to the Constitution─the (formal?) rule of law on the side of
politics. Regardless of one’s stand, we must be aware that this paradoxical
situation of ‘the political character of law and the apolitical (i.e.
constitutional) character of politics’ is a predetermined condition of the
８）Mizushima Asaho, Higashi-nihon-daishinsai to Kenpō: Kono Kuni e no Chokugen
[The Great East Japan Earthquake and the Constitution: Straightforward
Advice to this Country], Waseda University Press, 2012.
９）Cf. Aikyō Kōji, “Kokka kinkyū-ken to rikken shugi [Constitutionalism and
National Emergency Rights]”, in Okudaira Yasuhiro and Higuchi Yōichi, eds.
Kiki no kenpō-gaku [Constitutional Theories in a Time of Crisis], Kōbundō,
2013.
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present historical moment in Japan.
One of the problems of the Japanese Constitution not having emergency
situation provisions is that in the event of a situation beyond the scope of
assumption under the existing legal system concerning emergency
situations has occurred, the government has no alternative but to choose a
path through the situation by resorting to ‘extralegal measures’, by which I
mean special procedures beyond the law. Once such extralegal measures
have been executed, they involve the risk of serving as a precedent and
being repeatedly implemented one after another without limitation. Once in
the past, in the case of a terrorist incident caused by the Japanese Red
Army, Prime Ministers, Miki Takeo and Fukuda Takeo took such
measures to handle the situation. However, extralegal measures are
measures that should never be taken in a nation under the rule of law, and
therefore, it is not without reason that the opinion has been voiced, not
only by the opposition parties, but also by the ruling party, to the effect
that emergency situation provisions should be incorporated in the
Constitution. An international political scientist points out that unless the
Constitution is revised and emergency situation provisions are added
promptly, when faced with the ultimate situation in which both the Diet
and the Cabinet cease to function due to a large-scale disaster or armed
conflict, the people will fall into a situation that compels them to accept
extralegal measures to leave to the imperial decision of the Emperor the
appointment of the Prime Minister, which under normal circumstances
should be made as designated by the Diet.１０）
It is true that in the midst of time-sensitive emergency circumstances,
１０）Matsumura Masahiro, “Shinkyū-Kenpō no Keizokusei: Tennōsei wo shouten ni
[An Inquiry into Some Continuities of Japan’s Former and Current
Constitutions: the Status, Function and Prerogative of the Emperor]”, St.
Andrew’s University law review 19 (2012), 83-104.
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where neither the Diet nor the Cabinet is functioning, such emergency
powers may be actually exercised in an extralegal manner by the
Emperor. It goes without saying that the current Constitution denies the
powers of the Emperor related to government and strictly stipulates the
non-political nature of the Emperor in terms of the matters of state, under
which circumstances, it is a violation of the Constitution for the Emperor to
make his own decision as to who should be appointed Prime Minister.
Needless to say, in Japan, as an earthquake-prone country, because
emergency situations due to a disaster are highly predictable, extralegal
measures by the Emperor are not a card to be played and there should not
be any room left for that possibility. Even though such a possibility may be
extremely remote, to assume the extralegal exercise of such emergency
powers is an act that goes against the current of the times, which is the
establishment of the ‘constitutional symbolic monarchy under the principle
of popular sovereignty’,１１）a so-called ‘symbolic Emperor system’.１２）Based on
the definition Schmitt advances in his Politische Theologie, ‘Sovereign is he
who decides on the exception’,１３） in the unlikely event that extralegal
measures are declared by the Emperor, a situation may arise in which
violent accusations of ‘regressing to the world of the Meiji Constitution’ will
erupt, and it will rather rock the very foundations of the legitimacy of the
Emperor system itself. Under the circumstances, the first thing we need to
１１）Kenneth J. Ruoff, The People’s Emperor: Democracy and the Japanese
Monarchy, 1945-1995, Harvard University Asia Center, 2001, 86.
１２）Shimojo Yoshiaki, Shōchō Kunshusei Kenpō no 20 seikiteki Tenkai [20th
Century Development of Symbolic Monarchy Constitution], Toshindō, 2005.
Karube Tadashi, “Ima, Tennō ni tsuite Kataru Koto [On Talking about the
Emperor Today]”, Daikōkai 45, 2003, 136-142. Tominaga Nozomu, Shōchō
Tennōsei no Keisei to Teichaku [The Formation and Establishment of the
Symbolic Emperor System], Shibunkaku Shuppan, 2010.
１３）Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 13: ‘Souverän ist, wer über den Ausnahmezustand
entscheidet.’
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do would be to improve the legislation as soon as practicable. Even if
legislation that can completely address every state of emergency is
impossible, the anticipated fact of future large-scale earthquakes means
that some refinements to the system will be essential in an earthquake-
prone country such as Japan. The ‘disaster emergency situation’ of Chapter
9 of the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Law, which stipulates the
implementation of emergency measures through government ordinances
and otherwise, allows the temporary centralisation of necessary powers in
the Cabinet subject to the strict requirements at the outbreak of a
catastrophe, and is an aspect of the institutionalisation of national
emergency rights. From now on, by sorting out the problems involved in
the existing system for disaster countermeasures laws and regulations and
without waiting for the time-consuming revision of the Constitution, we
should promptly start the review process in a manner that suits the
current Constitution.
In parallel, experts will need to propose professional perspectives tailored
to Japanese conditions (e.g. the legal system and legal customs, history and
traditions, political and social conditions, geological and natural environment
and international situation) to address the problem of whether to introduce
emergency provisions by constitutional amendment or to acknowledge
extralegal measures (i.e., without constitutional amendment),all the while
responding to the ideological challenge of how to answer the fundamental
question that Schmitt poses to civil constitutionalism.
2.2. Disaster Relief Activities by the Self-Defence Forces and Article 9
Needless to say, security provided by the nation means not only activities
against a foreign country as in the case of a war, but also activities such as
protecting the people domestically in Japan. The experiences we had
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through the Great East Japan Earthquake allowed us to renew our
awareness of the roles and duties of the government and the SDF in terms
of the challenge as to how the people’s safety should be protected.
In the case of the Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake, the crisis
management system of the government was insufficient and the initial
response to the disaster was delayed. The government reflected on such ill-
preparedness and, taking that opportunity, the system for disaster
countermeasures laws and regulations was improved. Among others, as for
the fact that the initial response of the SDF to the disaster was delayed, an
argument was raised to the effect that the SDF Law should be revised and
the disaster relief activities of the SDF should be upgraded to the ‘main
mission’. The purpose of the SDF is stated in Paragraph 1 of Article 3 of
the SDF Law as follows: ‘The main mission of the SDF is to protect the
peace and independence, and preserve the safety of Japan by defending it
against direct and indirect aggression’. Article 83 defines that the disaster
relief operation is, so to speak, the ‘secondary mission’ of the SDF as long
as it does not pose a problem for executing such ‘main mission’ and can be
carried out. The foregoing argument is based on the view that disaster
relief operations should be upgraded to the main mission in the same
manner as national defence, but those who take the view that the identity
of the SDF lies in national defence show strong resistance to the upgrading
of disaster relief operations to the main mission. On the other hand, those
who take the view that the existence of the SDF itself violates Article 9 of
the Constitution and therefore is unconstitutional have presented a plan to
change its ‘main mission’ from national defence to disaster relief and
reorganise the SDF to be a special unit for disaster relief operations.１４）The
１４）Kuriki Hisao, “Kikikanri to Kenpō [Crisis Management and Constitution]”, in
Fujiwarashoten Henshūbu ed., Shinsai no Shisō: Hanshin Daishinsai to Sengo
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gulf between these two parties is huge. Therefore, there are at present no
prospects for the realisation of upgrading disaster relief operations to the
main mission.
However, in the case of the Great East Japan Earthquake, such disaster
relief operations, which are the ‘secondary mission’, were fully deployed.
Through its deeply-committed relief activities, the SDF came to be
appreciated by many people, and their support for the Forces was
substantially enhanced. At this time, I believe we can say that the main
part of the people’s support for the SDF lies not in the ‘main mission’, but
in disaster relief operations, their ‘secondary mission’.
Unlike the case of the Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake, the SDF
responded to the Great East Japan Earthquake in an extremely efficient
way. Having learned from the lesson of ‘Hanshin’ and by assigning troops
especially for disaster relief and keeping them ready to respond, the SDF
had repeatedly conducted full-fledged training for disaster relief operations.
Fire-fighting forces, police agencies and the Japan Coast Guard all played
remarkable roles, but in the case of the Great East Japan Earthquake,
coastal areas devastated by the tsunami extended as far as 600 kilometres
north to south, and even these three services combined were insufficient to
cope with the problems in the extremely vast disaster-stricken area. In
view of the lifesaving efforts extended over this vast area and the urgency
and size of the disaster relief, it is reasonable and indispensable to utilise
the SDF - which are the nation’s largest organised group to provide
manpower and large-scale and rapid transportation capacity. Through its
remarkable efforts in the rescue activities in the aftermath of the Great
Nihon [Thought of Earthquakes: the Great Hanshin Earthquake and Postwar
Japan], Fujiwarashoten, 1995, 254-255. Mizushima, Higashi-nihon-daishinsai to
Kenpō, 17-18.
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East Japan Earthquake, the SDF received a high evaluation not only from
the people of the disaster-stricken areas, but also from the entire nation.
However, the higher the evaluation that their ‘secondary mission’ becomes,
the more the balance and relationship with the ‘main mission’ will be
sought, and the SDF will be naturally forced to think about its raison d’être
again. Within the scope of the plan to respond to disasters such as the
Tonankai Earthquake, etc., which is deemed highly likely to occur in the
future, and while not upgraded to the main mission through a revision of
the SDF Law, the organisation’s ‘secondary mission’ is expected to be given
all the more priority. It seems to me that this will have an impact on the
SDF’s own self-evaluation.
3. Popular sentiment and the Emperor System
3.1. The Symbolic Emperor System and Social Integration Function
After the accident at the Fukushima No.1 Nuclear Power Plant was
announced, the circumstances surrounding the Imperial Family attracted
attention in the world of social media such as Twitter and Facebook. Is the
Emperor still at the Imperial Palace? Or was he evacuated somewhere? In
the former case, the Tokyo metropolitan area should still be safe, but if the
latter is the case, Tokyo must be in a pretty dangerous situation… In actual
fact, the circumstances surrounding the Emperor were used by the people
as a basis for making decisions about whether Tokyo was safe or not.
This turns the spotlight on the issue as to how the evacuation of the
Emperor and the Imperial Family is institutionally provided for in response
to emergency situations. For instance, where should the Emperor and the
Empress evacuate to? Will the Crown Prince’s Family go separately from
the perspective of hereditary security or are they supposed to do so?
Would it be possible for them to temporarily evacuate overseas in a grave
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situation? Is the communication route between the government and the
Imperial Family institutionally secured? And so on. Although I mentioned
earlier that it is necessary to further develop a legal infrastructure for
disasters, it is necessary that the act of evacuating by the Imperial Family
should also be legally provided for, and that such information be released to
the public. This is because the evacuation of the Emperor and the Imperial
Family in an emergency, although it is a private act, cannot be deemed as
a simple private act in the event that the duration of their refuge stretches
over a long period of time or in the event that the outcome of the act of
evacuation has a significant impact on the people. That is to say, there is a
possibility that this act may become a public act of a public nature.
With regard to the Emperor’s acts under the Constitution of Japan,
among the conventional theories and the government interpretations, the
most widely accepted is the theory that classifies the Emperor’s acts into
three types, that is, ‘state acts’ to be carried out as a national institution,
such as the convocation of the Diet, ‘public acts’ to be carried out based on
the status of the Emperor as the symbol such as the formal reception for
distinguished foreign guests and ‘private acts’ to be carried out as a private
individual such as attending a music concert. What should be noted here
are public acts. Although public acts do not fall into the category of state
acts, as it is difficult to regard them as purely private acts, this refers to
acts deemed to have a public nature. According to the government’s
constitutional interpretation, the Emperor’s public acts are seen as
symbolic acts derived from the Emperor’s symbolic nature and, unlike the
state acts that are based on the advice and approval of the Cabinet, do not
constitutionally require the advice and approval of the Cabinet but are to
be carried out in such a manner that the Imperial Household Agency and
the Cabinet exercising control over this Agency assume responsibility for
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these acts.１５）Therefore, in the event that a post-disaster act of the Emperor
is deemed to have an impact, as the act of a public official, on the people,
such an act needs to be carried out with the direct assistance of the
Cabinet or the indirect assistance through the Imperial Household Agency
and under the responsibility of the Cabinet. In normal times, it is
customary that specific information about the Emperor’s public acts is
announced through official gazettes that carry notifications of the Imperial
Household Agency. In the case of public acts in normal times, there is no
problem with a notification method which is based on customary practices.
But in the event of an emergency, in order not to upset the public, it is
necessary to disclose information about the Emperor’s safety and
evacuation as may be necessary. To enable this, it is essential both to
establish a system relating to the evacuation behaviour of the Emperor and
the Imperial Family in case of emergency and build it into the government
emergency measures to secure their safety, and to make the structure
available and widely known to the public.
The ‘comforting words’ given by the Emperor and the Empress on the
occasion of their visit to disaster-stricken areas and memorial ceremonies
after the Earthquake not only gained significant support from the public,
but also soothed the dark and stricken hearts of the people, caused by the
uneasiness from the shock of the Earthquake and the sorrow over the loss
of loved ones and fellow citizens, and maintained the unity of the people
and fulfilled the function of social integration. It was in striking contrast
with the sharp criticism of the Kan government which had fallen into
confusion in dealing with the nuclear accident. The separation of power
and authority, with the government as the major pillar of power and the
Emperor as the bearer of authority, is a distinct feature of Japan’s
１５）Shimojo, Shōchō Kunshusei Kenpō no 20 seikiteki Tenkai, Ch. 4-6.
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governing system. While the Liberal Democratic Party specifies the
nomination of the Emperor as the head of state in its proposed amendment
of the Constitution in order to clarify the conservation of this authority,
according to the generally-accepted theory of the study of the constitution,
there is a strong tendency to object to the strengthening of the Emperor’s
powers and disclaim the nomination of the Emperor as the head of state.
However, both sides have the same aspect in common in that they are all
developing their argument with a traditional concept of the head of state in
mind, just like the head of state of the Meiji Constitution. In the
constitutions of various countries of the world in recent years, the number
of provisions specifying the head of state as, so to speak, the symbol of the
nation, like the monarch or the President as the symbol of integration of
the nation and people, is increasing. Under these circumstances, I believe
arguments for and against the nomination of the Emperor as the head of
state in Japan should be made by taking such recent movements into
consideration. In addition, the Emperor has so far been playing a role in
building international goodwill in the field of association with foreign
countries by virtually representing the nation and its people and has been
practically regarded as the head of state under international law by various
countries around the world. It would be necessary to review the scope and
the pros and cons of the Emperor’s public acts by taking such facts into
consideration.１６）
The Emperor system changed from the prewar ‘theocratic Emperor
system’ to the postwar ‘symbolic Emperor system’. After the war as well,
the Emperor system continued to exist, however, when comparing the
Meiji Constitution and the current Constitution of Japan, the sovereign has
changed from the Emperor to the people and the governing system has
１６）Ibid., 70-71, 156-157.
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been fundamentally changed. That is to say, the grounds for justification of
the monarchy are completely different. The ‘symbolic Emperor system’ is
the ‘Constitutional symbolic monarchy under the principle of popular
sovereignty’ and may be abolished by the will of the people. In other
words, the ‘symbolic Emperor system’ is based on the assumption that
there is popular sentiment for the Emperor, such as a sense of respect for
and adoration of the Emperor. The fact that the sense of community exists
reminds us that the Emperor is the symbol of the integration of the nation
and its people. The Emperor can exist by continuing to be the motive for
confirming such a sense of community, that is, the sense of Japan’s unity as
a people.
With the sense of unity generated through experiencing one and the
same catastrophe and a feeling of sympathy for disaster victims and
condolences for the dead being expressed by the Emperor, the unified
sense of community as a people is formed and such people are reminded of
the history and destiny of the national community to which they belong in
the substance that has a personality called the Emperor. And then, through
the figure of the Emperor, the unity of the people is confirmed and a
feeling of sympathy for disaster victims will be shared anew as popular
sentiment among the people. In this way, the Emperor helps to fulfil the
function of being the symbol of the integration of the Japanese people and
will go on to integrate society.
Although the post-war Emperor system removed the ‘divine right’
aspect that had been present before the war, it has continued to retain,
albeit in a reduced form, the mythical and charismatic elements inherent to
the monarchy itself. Whereas Schmitt had sought to assimilate the German
people into a homogeneous community with Christian belief as its unifying
force, in the case of Japan, the ‘symbolic Emperor system’ as an institution
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can be said to contribute to fostering the myth of the homogeneity that
Schmitt insisted upon. Conversely, however, the charismatic element of the
Emperor system can also easily be converted so as to evoke a national
mythology at a time of emergency; the social integration role of the
Emperor is a type of double-edged sword, and there is a need for the
people to carefully monitor this point.
3.2. Democracy and Liberalism surrounding the Emperor
The Emperor system under the Constitution of Japan is a hereditary
system. The following criticism has arisen from this fact. Such an Emperor
system in which the succession to the imperial throne is determined by
family line conflicts with the fundamental principle of the modern
constitution, namely, equality under the law, and therefore, it is a
contradiction that the Constitution of Japan, the basic philosophy of which
is the principle of popular sovereignty, has approved of the Emperor
system. That is to say, the criticism is such that the Emperor system and
democracy are incompatible with each other and, therefore, the Emperor
system should be abolished. However, as Inoue Tatsuo, a philosopher of
law, pointed out, actually, the postwar democracy of Japan chose to
continue the Emperor system rather than adhering totally to the
philosophy of a civil society.１７）According to various opinion polls, the
number of people who answered that they have a positive feeling toward
the Emperor remained high,１８） and this shows that the Emperor system
continues to exist not simply because it was forcibly imposed by Douglas
MacArthur and the GHQ (General Headquarters of the Supreme
１７）Inoue Tatsuo, Gendai no Hinkon: Riberarizumu no Nihon Shakai Ron [Poverty
of Today: An Essay on Japanese Society from the Perspective of Liberalism],
Iwanami Shoten, 2011, 37.
１８）According to a public opinion poll by Asahi Shimbun in 2002, 86 percent of
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commander for the Allied Powers) to deal with postwar issues, but because
it is supported from below, with the people’s interest in and friendly feeling
toward the Emperor reaching down to the grass roots. Democracy does
not always deny the monarchy. As I mentioned before, in Japan after the
Earthquake, the Emperor’s visits to comfort disaster victims uplifted the
people’s friendly feelings toward the Emperor and gained support from
them all the more, contributing to the integration of Japanese society. As
such symbolic acts of the Emperor directly work on popular sentiment,
they can serve as the driving force to revitalise participatory democracy.
Therefore, the more democracy develops, paradoxically, the more the
Emperor system becomes socially established, and in this sense, we can
say that the Emperor system and democracy can be compatible with each
other.
However, according to Inoue, the Emperor’s ability to attract support not
only enhances the people’s energy for participating democratically, but also
has the risk of regenerating the myth of a homogeneous society.１９）The
Emperor as the symbol of the cultural integration of the ‘Japanese people’
has the tendency to make invisible the heterogeneous minorities and
diversity that exist in Japanese society, and even contributes to the
pressure to forcibly impose the homogenisation that is inherent in
democracy. After all, democracy is a political system, based on the
principle of the identity of the ruler and the ruled, which requires that
even a minority, who have different views, accept a collective decision
made by the majority of representatives in the case of a representative
democracy as the will of the people as a whole, in a way that is
respondents supported the Emperor as a symbol of Japan. According to a poll
by NHK in 2009, 82 percent of the Japanese public supported the Emperor as a
symbol of the nation.
１９）Inoue, Gendai no Hinkon, Part I.
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reminiscent of Jean Jacques Rousseau’s ‘General Will’. To resolve the
practical problem that the ruler and the ruled are not completely identical,
democracy has a tendency to forcibly impose harmonisation and
homogenisation on heterogeneous minorities within the society. This is the
so-called ‘majoritarian autocratic’ aspect of democracy.
Japan is known as a country of liberal democracy, however, as I
mentioned before, we can say that the Emperor system, as the symbol of
the people, is performing the function of social integration and, far from
being incompatible, is even supporting democracy. However, from another
perspective that of liberalism, the Emperor system is party to the forcible
imposition of homogenisation, which disregards the heterogeneous minority
demand for liberty and equality and, therefore, has an aspect that conflicts
with liberalism, which calls for individual liberty and respect for
fundamental human rights.
Furthermore, the Emperor system and liberalism involve not only the
problems viewed from the side of the people such as the infringement of
human rights and the violation of the principle of separation of state and
religion, but also the problems relating to the Emperor himself. It is a
problem that as compensation for his special function as the symbol of the
people and the special privileges associated therewith, the Emperor is not
virtually granted the liberty or human rights that are enjoyed by the
people.
Inoue argues that to guarantee human rights for the Emperor and the
Imperial Family, the Japanese people need to revise the assumption that
democracy, as the principle of popular sovereignty, is the basic philosophy
of the Constitution of Japan, and adopt anew the guarantee of the
fundamental human rights of individuals, which are called for by liberalism,
as the basic philosophy of the Constitution.２０） The reason is that to
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accomplish the protection of human rights of the Emperor and the Imperial
Family, it is necessary to do away with his impersonal status as the symbol
of the integration of the people and return them to the status of private
individuals, that is to say, to abolish the symbolic Emperor system.
However, under current circumstances, where the majority of the people
hope for the symbolic Emperor system to be maintained, it is impossible to
abolish the system as long as the people live under the principle of
democracy. Supposing that liberalism is the basic philosophy of the
Constitution, when the governing power makes a democratic collective
decision, the philosophy first gives guidance to make an assessment as to
whether the decision conflicts with the respect for fundamental human
rights and, therefore, enables the people to avoid falling into autocracy by
the majority. That is to say, liberalism guides people toward a democratic
decision, and leads and restricts such a decision in the direction of respect
for human rights. According to Inoue’s view, the logic of liberalism
ultimately requires that even the Emperor himself accomplish the
protection of human rights, which necessarily results in calling for the
abolition of the symbolic Emperor system, or in other words, follows that
the symbolic Emperor system conflicts with liberalism.
Inoue’s comment is significant because it has clearly reveals the problem
that the people’s democratic support for the Emperor as the symbol has a
risk of trampling down the liberty and human rights of the Emperor as a
human being. His point of view is highly thought-provoking in that he
pointed out that it is also necessary not to give democracy absolute
priority but to constrain it in some cases so as not to fall into an ‘autocracy
by the majority’. However, it is critically important that ‘the sovereign’ is
changed to ‘the people’ in the Constitution of Japan. Provided that the
２０）Ibid., 25.
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provisions for the protection of human rights form the raison d’être of the
current Constitution, the constituent power lies in the people, that is, the
sovereign and it is possible as a matter of form for the people to abolish
the provisions for human rights as well as the symbolic Emperor system.
In opposition to this idea, Inoue argues that the constitutional amendment
power stipulated in Article 96 is not unlimited, as long as it is based on the
Constitution, and that the abolition of the essential part of the system for
the protection of human rights is out of the range of amendment power.２１）
In Die Diktatur [On Dictatorship], Schmitt, a critic of liberalism,
distinguishes between the power of the people to establish a constitution
and power that has been authorised on the basis of the constitution,
emphasising that the former is, in principle, unlimited.２２） If we follow this
idea, the power to establish a constitution held by the people (as
Sovereign) is the power to create a constitution and therefore, exists prior
to the constitution; this power is of a different dimension than the power to
amend the Constitution given to the people in Article 96 of the Japanese
Constitution. There have already been a number of studies in the field of
constitutional law with regard to the interpretation of power to establish a
constitution, to which I refer those readers interested in issues of legal
theory. What I would like to emphasise here is that the philosophy of
guaranteeing human rights does not simply match the principle of popular
sovereignty, which is to say that democracy and liberalism, more than we
generally believe, are fundamentally in conflict with one another.
Inoue’s approach for grasping liberalism as a philosophy on a higher level
that constrains democracy is considered to be in the genealogy of the
theory of justice of Rousseau, who tried to find the conditions for the
２１）Ibid., 78-79.
２２）Schmitt, Die Diktatur, 137.
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realisation of justice, and of John Rawls, who recognised Rousseau as a
pioneer. To guarantee the universality and morality of the ‘General Will’,
Rousseau, who established the theory of popular sovereignty, imposed ‘Civil
Religion’ (a device to combine patriotism with love for all humanity) on the
citizens who are the sovereign as a lawmaker and the subjects as a people
subject to laws.２３） Rawls, succeeding Rousseau, established the theory of
‘Justice as Fairness’ to make equality and liberty, as well as democracy and
liberalism, theoretically compatible with each other.２４）These theories were
the efforts to work out the foundation for social justice, that is, the
equivalent of what used to be called ‘natural law’, and still remain difficult
problems even at present.
4.The Will to Politics
As mentioned at the outset, we who live in a post-disaster era must
prepare ourselves to confront ‘the Political’. In the Europe that provided a
foothold for Schmitt, ‘the Political’ was related to the fear of death due to
riots, coup d’états, domestic conflicts and wars. In contrast, in Japan, ‘the
Political’ has been made apparent and reactivated as a result of the fear of
death due to the explosion of a nuclear power plant triggered by a natural
disaster and the fear of death resulting from uncertain long-term radiation
damage. Accordingly, in post-disaster Japan, ‘the Political’ conceptualised
by Schmitt as an uncertainty that continuously inspires fear in the people
is linked less to the fear of war than to the fear of natural disaster.
Post-war Japan, fortunately, has escaped any further direct experience of
２３）Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du contrat social, in Œuvres complètes, Bibliothèque
de la Pléiade, édition publiée sous la direction de Bernard Gagnebin et Marcel
Raymond, 5 tomes, 1959-95, t. III.
２４）John Rawls; Erin Kelly ed., Justice as Fairness: a Restatement, Harvard
University Press, 2001. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed., Harvard
University Press, 1999.
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war. Even if there is no guarantee that this will continue in future, there is
still the possibility that war will be prevented through diplomatic efforts
and prudent strategies of national security. Yet, humanity has no ability to
prevent the occurrence of natural disasters. There are currently 54 nuclear
power plants across Japan. There are predictions of large-scale
earthquakes occurring in the future, and no matter where in Japan these
might occur, every time Japan experiences a massive earthquake, the fear
of death due to disasters and radiation damage will be re-instilled. This is
Japan’s tragedy. However, since these are predetermined conditions in
Japan, they may have to be accepted. Similar to how we carry out disaster
prevention measures to minimise disaster damages, we have no choice but
to make calm judgements and decisions with regard to each issue that
must be considered while checking for the concealment or
instrumentalisation of ‘the Political’ by confronting the stark reality of
politics.
By turning attention of the people to the fear of violent death, Schmitt
attempted to replace the milestone of modernity that was the move ‘from
politics to law’ with the move ‘from law to politics’, thereby to bring about
a political situation that could activate political decision-making in Germany.
However, while this does not mean that Schmitt’s philosophy necessarily
led to the subsequent rise of Nazism, we know that his philosophy has
affinity with totalitarianism. Therefore, we cannot afford to adopt the
‘maximisation of politics’, which Schmitt prescribed as an antidote to
modernity, at face value. We must acknowledge the problems of modernity,
which lead to apathy and political stalemate, and then formulate new
alternatives. This is something that we will create and discover amidst the
practice of living in this country, based on the various conditions of Japan’s
legal system and legal customs, history, traditions and culture, political and
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social conditions, the natural environment and international relations.
Hobbes argues that the human will is the discharge of a passion that
flows from the conflict we experience between the fear of death and hope
for life. Human beings do not continue to live a life motivated solely by
fear. Following Hobbes, the continuation of life, as the inverse of the fear of
death, should always be supported by the hope for life. Politics is collective
decision-making. We who live in a post-disaster era must link our living
hopes to the next generation without being swallowed up by ‘the Political’
that is based on fear. To accomplish this, we have no choice but to combat
‘the Political’ on a basis of hope and to involve our own will in politics as
we conceive new alternatives within the relationship between law and
politics.
Conclusion
The Constitution of Japan written in 1946 is a framework which was
embodied in the agreement of the 1951 Peace Treaty with Japan. Although
the Constitution with its principle of popular sovereignty, the Emperor
system and Article 9 is in fact a highly political device, this framework has
made it look like nonpolitical. However, the Great East Japan Earthquake
has revealed the contradiction, which is invisible in peacetime. It made the
Japanese people realise how political the Constitution and the postwar
regime are. The Japanese people have recognised the political nature of the
framework at the level of popular sentiment. What they need now is to
understand the political nature of their own Constitution and the postwar
regime more intellectually. And then they should reconsider the matters of
the sovereignty and security, and form public opinion about democracy and
liberalism through citizenship education. Generally speaking, self-
conciousness of sovereignty is often prompted by conflicts with other
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countries, but such conflicts only make the people emotional and cannot
lead them to think calmly and objectively. However, disasters are the
power of Nature, which human beings can do nothing about and give us
the opportunity to reconsider who the people who seek security are and
what kind of country is one that guarantees the security of its people,
without making an ‘enemy’ of someone.
（UMEDA Yurika, Professor of Faculty of Economics at Momoyama Gakuin University,
Accepted on 19 November, 2014）
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Abstract
This essay examines the political aspects of the Japanese Constitution,
especially following Carl Schmitt’s critique of liberalism and the logic of the
civil constitutional state to reconsider issues with the Self-Defence Forces,
the Emperor system and national emergency rights that were made
apparent by the Great East Japan Earthquake of 11 March 2011. The
Constitution of Japan written in 1946 is a framework which was embodied
in the agreement of the 1951 Peace Treaty with Japan. Although the
Constitution with its principle of popular sovereignty, the Emperor system
and Article 9 is in fact a highly political device, this framework has made it
look like nonpolitical. However, the Great East Japan Earthquake has
revealed the contradiction, which is invisible in peacetime, by confronting
the people with the harsh reality of security. It made the Japanese people
realise how political the Constitution and the postwar regime are. The
essay focuses on popular sentiment concerning the constitutional problems.
It argues that the Japanese people who live in a post-disaster era have to
formulate new alternatives within the relationship between law and politics
based on the conditions of Japan’s legal system and legal customs, history,
tradition and culture, political and social conditions, the natural
environment and international relations.
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